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1. INTRODUCTION
The field of  soft computing comprises three branches of  research and applications: (1) Neural networks that serve as a framework for modeling how brains 
function, (2) fuzzy systems that model how humans describe 
the world around them linguistically, and (3) evolutionary 
computation that accounts for variation and natural selection 
in the biological world (Keller et al., 2016). Current research 
in soft computing exploits the tolerance for uncertainty, 
ambiguity, approximate reasoning, and partial truth to 
achieve tractable, robust, and computationally economic 
solutions. As previously explored (Hamid et al., 2017), one 
issue in the application of  soft computing is the degree to 
which human intelligence and artificial intelligence (AI) 
share similar quantitative or qualitative properties or both. 
Despite the clear differences between AI on one hand, and 
the first-person perspective of  lived experience of  humans on 
the other, human-machine coexistence is increasing (Hamid 
et al., 2017).
In a recent work, we discussed the relative importance of  
direct perception, embodiment, metaphors, and ethics for 
cooperative human-machine coexistence (Smith and Hamid, 
2017). The current work examines models of  embodied 
cognitive science with an emphasis on the significance of  
physical existence and perception in order for AI to capture 
successfully the dynamics of  the interactions of  the brain, 
body, and world. The paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 addresses phenomenology as a framework for describing 
first-person experiences along with Gibson’s (2014) account 
of  information in textured grounds as the source of  direct 
perception (as opposed to information processing models 
in which the processing of  visual stimuli, for instance, after 
it enters the eye becomes the source of  perception). In 
Section 3, we introduce Merleau-Ponty’s view of  embodied 
existence in the world as primary in the process of  perception. 
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We then discuss in Section 4 the integration of  the body in 
cognitive science and consider its implication in the design of  
interactive artificial systems. We finally conclude in Section 5.
2. Gibson’s Direct Perception
Phenomenology has typically used a figure-ground structure 
to explain experience in general and perception in particular, 
applying the methodology to a number of  areas of  interest 
(Smith, 2002). Rubin’s vase in is probably the most common 
example of  a figure-ground grouping [Figure 1a]. Whenever 
one’s lived experience matters and nuances of  first-person 
human experience are important – in contrast to third-person 
behavioral observations, measurements of  the body, or any 
other single, privileged position – empirical phenomenology 
provides a proper methodology to follow (Pollio et al., 1997). 
Although it does not use interviews to look for themes as does 
the methodology above, Gibson’s (2014) direct perception 
is one approach that has impacted the field of  ergonomics 
by focusing on grounds in the process of  perception. His 
ecological view claims ground in the environment defines 
the spatial character of  the visual world, not what happens 
to stimuli after entering the eye. In short, information in a 
textured ground, not objects, explains perception. Gibson 
became interested in the world as a source of  information 
instead of  looking for processing mechanisms in one’s 
head, and he subsequently contradicted the centuries-old 
epistemology of  perception as the processing of  copies. 
Gibson states, we perceive space directly from the ground, 
which explains the term direct perception.
A ground in many cases is a continuous surface or an array of  
adjoining surfaces. Gibson provided examples of  optic arrays 
and looked for patterns of  optic flow in them such as the 
experience of  changes in the flow when approaching or moving 
away from a certain point [Figure 1b]. Moreover, learning 
does not merely come from the stimulus-response model of  
behaviorism. All spatial perceptions are in regard to a textured 
ground, usually the earth (Gibson, 2014). The spatial character 
of  the visual world is given not by an analysis of  the objects 
in it but rather by a consideration of  the background against 
which the objects appear and become figural. In addition, most 
perceivers are in motion either because they are moving in some 
direction or they are moving their heads. Some information, 
however, remains constant as an observer moves. Gibson 
referred to a non-change as an invariant, defined as a property 
of  the environment that remains constant despite illumination 
changes or movement of  the observer (Gibson, 2014).
In stark contrast to what Gibson refers to as cognitivism, 
in direct perception, no intervening mental processes are 
necessary. He simply rejects any so-called operations of  the 
mind, mental entities such as sense data. Grounds provide 
the information necessary for us to perceive directly, and we 
use such information immediately with no need to transform 
it. Again, unlike Gibson’s (2014) characterization of  the old 
idea that we process sensory inputs and convert them into 
perceptions – the information processing model in any of  
its various forms – his claim is the extraction of  invariants 
from the stimulus flux is a more accurate model of  visual 
perception. As shown in Figure 1c, an observer’s movement 
toward a location results in environmental textures that flow 
everywhere except the invariant center. To stay on course, 
one needs to keep the center of  the optical flow pattern 
on the destination. Importantly, when Gibson referred to 
representational models as old, he was correct in that the idea 
goes back to Democritus (460–370 B.C.). In addition, primarily 
due to Plato (approximately 428–348 B.C.), the representational 
theory has been particularly influential (Malone, 2009).
One application of  Gibson’s model involved pilots landing 
aircraft in the earlier days of  aviation. In some cases, 
airplanes were not stopping soon enough on runways. 
Gibson determined that the relatively fast or slow flow of  
the optic array in relation to a fixed point of  reference gave 
the sensation of  speed and apparent speed related to one’s 
distance from the ground. As a consequence, Gibson was 
able to explain how pilots in a cockpit high enough from 
the runway sensed they were moving slow enough to stop 
before a runway ended, when in fact they were running out 
of  space on the runway to stop.
Although typically presented in contrast to information 
processing and Gestalt psychology, Gibson’s model of  
perception is not entirely passive. The role of  a moving, 
embodied active observer is clear throughout his research, and 
in his analysis of  active touch, there is a distinction between 
active and passive perception. For example, an observer may 
actively explore the surfaces of  objects and not merely feel an 
experimenter pushing on one’s skin. Bottom-up models of  
perception where no learning is required, such as that of  Gibson, 
are not applicable to all situations in the same way that any top-
down model is also not uniformly appropriate, but Gibson’s 
work clearly demonstrates the usefulness of  direct perception.
3. MERLEAU-PONTY’S VIEW OF EMBODIMENT
Merleau-Ponty is the best theorist to address our embodied 
existence in the world as primary in the process of  
perception, and the significance of  the body-as-subject. 
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According to the main idea of  Merleau-Ponty, our embodied 
inheritance is more fundamental than our reflexive capacity, 
and our analytic mode is derivative from the body’s immediate 
exposure to the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). A first-person 
perspective reveals the failings of  both empiricism and 
what he calls intellectualism, also known as philosophical 
rationalism or idealism. Stated simply, we have a world and 
access to the world through the body. When Merleau-Ponty 
states, we are our bodies, he does not undermine so-called 
mental phenomena, but rather he incorporates the perceiving 
mind into an incarnated body. Using our minds is inseparable 
from how we are situated physically. In other words, in 
an embodied state of  being, the material and ideational 
are intimately linked in the body-subject that thinks and 
perceives. Merleau-Ponty stresses the body is not solely an 
object, merely one of  many material components of  the 
world, but is our means of  communication with the world 
(Internet Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, 2017).
One example, he provides is when one’s left-hand touches 
the right hand while the right-hand touches an object; the 
right hand as object (muscles, flesh) is different from it as a 
touching subject (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). This is how one’s 
body is both perceived object and perceiving subject, if  not 
simultaneously then in an oscillation. Another example is 
when both hands are pressed together, as either hand can 
alternate in its role of  either touching or being touched 
[Figure 2]. It is not the case that one simply has two 
sensations together as if  grasping two objects lying next 
to each another. The ambiguity of  touching and touched 
is representative of  the full process of  perception, and 
when the body-subject acts, it is inseparable from when 
the body-subject perceives. Merleau-Ponty also refers to the 
reversibility of  the body in its ability to be both sentient and 
sensible (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Furthermore, consciousness 
is better understood as a matter of  “I can” instead of  
“I think that.” In short, our lived experience denies the 
differentiation of  mind from body and does not allow the 
detachment of  subject from object (Internet Encyclopedia 
of  Philosophy, 2017).
4. INTEGRATION OF THE BODY IN COGNITIVE 
SCIENCE
Embodied cognitive science is in contrast to the formerly 
dominant view of  the body as peripheral to cognition and that 
any computations cannot occur without mental representations. 
According to computational or representational views, cognition 
happens when a device in a system - typically human but 
machine-based in the case of  AI - uses, supports, or otherwise 
manipulates symbols for goal-directed behavior (Cohen and 
Murphy, 1984). The problem with view is that it does not allow 
for the full complexity of  mental functions. Consequently, 
research in AI became stuck because it failed to imitate higher 
mental activities. Characteristics of  embodied cognition, in 
contrast, depend on and are integrated with a body such that 
without a body there would be limited or even no corresponding 
thinking (Wilson and Golonka, 2013). Bodies considerably 
influence cognitive processing and serve as grounds for language 
Figure 2. The ambiguity of touching and being touched: Body as 
subject and body as object simultaneously. Picture retrieved from: 
https://www.123rf.com.
Figure 1. (a) Rubin’s figure. (b) The pattern of optic flow when looking out of the back of a train. (c) The point toward which a pilot is moving 
appears motionless, whereas the rest of the visual environment appears to move away from that point. The figures were retrieved from (a) http://
figuresambigues.free.fr, (b and c) https://frederikkechristiansenpsychology.wordpress.com
a b c
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and cognition. Stated differently, the body’s position, multimodal 
sensory inputs, intuitions of  the motor system, environmental 
interaction, and other aspects all shape features of  cognition. 
Interestingly, cognitive scientists have six distinguished views 
about what embodied cognition is Wilson (2002).
One proposal of  an embodied mind that attempted to 
integrate cognitive science and human experience (Varela 
et al., 2017) stated that sensorimotor capacities are embedded 
in biological, psychological, and cultural contexts. The authors 
used the word enaction to refer to the process of  mutual 
interactions among physiology, sensorimotor circuits, and 
the environment and how these determine the experienced 
world. In this view, there is a clear connection of  the brain, 
body, and world. It follows that only organisms with certain 
characteristics, namely, certain skills or organs such as hands 
or eyes, would be able to have particular cognitive capacities. 
One of  these authors, Francisco Valera, is also known for 
popularizing neurophenomenology and began to support 
embodied philosophy in 1990s. Although the work of  this 
group included Buddhism and psychoanalysis, as well, these 
topics are not as relevant to the current discussion.
According to embodied cognition, there are three ways 
cognition depends on the body. The body can serve as a 
constraint on cognition, a distributor for cognition, or as 
a regulator of  cognitive activity (Venon, 2014). The body 
acts to condition cognition by playing one of  these three 
roles. Any kind of  variation in bodies is an example of  a 
constraint on cognition when it constrains the content of  
representations. Some kinds of  thought will simply be easier 
than others depending on the body in question. The body also 
distributes, or shares in the processing of, load between the 
brain and the body. An organism’s body regulates cognitive 
activity to coordinate action and cognition. Thus, the body 
is fundamentally important in the control of  cognition and 
does not merely aid in the transmission of  sensory input.
Similarly, robotics researcher Brooks (1990) argued that we 
will be able to achieve true AI only with machines that have 
sensory and motor skills and are connected to the world 
through a body. His emphasis is on intelligence without 
symbolic representation and ongoing interaction with the 
world, not just internal algorithms. Abstract manipulation of  
symbols in AI failed, for the most part, to become grounded 
in physical reality. Hence, an embodied methodology started 
to gain momentum.
Brooks (1990) also stated that reliance on a model of  
representation disappears when intelligence is approached 
in an incremental manner, or when there is strict reliance on 
interfacing to the real world through perception and action. 
Furthermore, it is unnecessary to decompose an intelligent 
system into independent information processing units that 
need to interface with one other through representations. 
Rather, the intelligent system, he designed decomposes into 
independent and parallel activity producers that interface 
directly to the world through perception and action. There 
are no longer central and peripheral systems because 
everything is both central and peripheral. To demonstrate 
the concept, Brooks built a series of  mobile robots able to 
operate unsupervised based on the above principles, referring 
to them as creatures in standard office environments. There 
were four requirements for these creatures: They must (i) be 
able to maintain multiple goals, (ii) cope with environmental 
changes both appropriately and timely, (iii) be robust in 
interaction with the dynamic environment, and (iv) even be 
able to “do something” in the world, or have some purpose 
in being (Brooks, 1990. p. 143).
Likewise, the idea that minds are for doing, not thinking, 
is the product of  Andy Clark’s book being there: Putting 
brain, body, and world together again (1998). Rather than 
becoming a walking encyclopedia, a more successful aim 
for an AI would be to understand the dynamics among 
the brain, body, and world. Synthesizing techniques from 
neuroscience, robotics, and infant psychology, Clark 
examined many adaptive behaviors and suggested that the key 
to understanding the brain is to see it in terms of  embodied 
activity. To treat cognition solely in terms of  problem-solving 
is to depart from the world in which our brains evolved to 
guide us.
The work of  Lakoff  and Johnson (2003) in linguistics 
also supports the prevalence of  embodiment, specifically 
the experiential grounding, coherence, and systematicity 
of  metaphorical concepts and their role in how we 
fundamentally understand, organize, and share the world. 
The idea relevant for this paper is that metaphors are primary 
not only for language but also in human thought processes. 
They dominate cognition because our conceptual system 
is structured metaphorically, and this is why metaphors as 
linguistic expressions are possible and sensible. The authors 
also demonstrate how an experiential view can explain how 
metaphors are frequent, organized, and useful, in contrast to 
any view that neglects the necessity of  an experiential basis. 
Metaphors structure personally meaningful concepts such 
as “education is a journey,” “time is money,” “life is a play,” 
“argument is war,” and “knowledge is food.” Explanations 
of  particular metaphors (“social organizations are plants”), 
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however, are not set in stone. To understand metaphors 
fully, we cannot separate them from their experiential base 
that is often grounded in the body through physiological 
development. More generally, basic orientation metaphors 
such “in vs. out” and “up vs. down” reveal a fundamental 
understanding that is based on the body. It follows that 
rational corresponds to up and emotional to down (Lakoff  
and Johnson, 2003).
5. CONCLUSION
Whether the limitations of  computational and representational 
models of  cognition to effect progress in AI were recognized 
25 years ago or only more recently (Dreyfus, 1992), it is no 
longer necessary to adopt a single framework for substantial 
improvement. Embodied cognitive science is one promising 
approach, and there will be other applications that allow us to 
acknowledge problems and implement innovative solutions for 
acute societal problems such as combating money laundering 
(Hamid, 2017) or promoting green technologies for smart cities 
(Schaffers et al., 2011). The adoption of  a “both and” view 
instead of  an “either or” one as a guiding principle for research 
means that embodied cognition may contain representational, 
abstract, and symbolic aspects. Specifically, for AI, a major 
challenge is that in addition to having nobody, it does not 
participate in physical, linguistic, or sensorimotor development. 
Whereas such profound contrasts may render the unification of  
AI and HI insurmountable, the potential for human-machine 
coordination and coexistence remains strong (Smith and 
Hamid, 2017). What is needed is a more detailed understanding 
of  the mechanisms at work in various subfields where AI and 
HI intersect and interact. Put simply, whereas computational 
and representational models require an intermediate entity that 
processes information so as to facilitate perception (which is a 
key element in the design of  functioning AI systems), embodied 
cognition does not have this as a necessary condition. Given that 
the main goal of  AI is for machines to reach the point where 
they can think like and interact with humans, we cannot ignore 
certain practical implications. Specifically, for AI engineers and 
cyber-physical systems’ scientists, integrating the principles of  
embodied cognition into the traditional computational and 
representational models can widen the possibilities of  designing 
better functioning (and probably more human-like) AI systems, 
which will increase cooperative human-machine coexistence.
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